Sterilized foreign exchange market interventions have been suspected of being inef…cient by many empirical studies, but they are plagued by endogeneity problems. To solve the problems, this paper identi…es a system that depicts interactions between the interventions and the foreign exchange rate. The model shows that the interventions are e¤ective when the interventions alter the market participants' conditional expectations of the rate without decreasing the conditional variances. This paper estimates Markov-switching type policy reaction functions by conditional MLE, and market demand/supply curves by IV estimation with generated regressors. The empirical results verify that the interventions of the Bank of Korea from 2001 to 2002 were indeed effective.
Introduction
The e¤ectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions has been one of the intensively discussed topics in central bank policy analysis. After myriads of papers have investigated the topic, a skeptical view that the sterilized interventions do not have meaningful impacts on the nominal exchange rate has prevailed. (Craig and Humpage(2001) ) At best, the results are mixed in general. 1 However, it is still true that the debate is not closed yet, because the literatures are plagued by endogeneity problems. Through the identi…cation of the system and valid instrumental variables(IVs), this paper estimated the e¤ect with minimizing the endogeneity bias described as follows.
The …rst endogeneity problem comes from the simultaneity between the intervention decision and the contemporary exchange rate. That is, the intervention may have changed the current spot rate, but it may also be true that the current spot rate movement leads to the intervention. If we regress the rate movements on interventions with a single equation such as
where S t is a di¤erence in the exchange rate, IN T t is the central bank intervention, and X t is other explanatory variables, this well known problem makes IN T t endogenous, thus we will have an inconsistent estimator for 1 .
(Neely(2005), Kearns and Rigobon(2005))
Endogeneity also comes from omitted variables in equation (1) . To be clearer on this point, let's assume that the interventions are decided regardless of the current spot rate.
Although IN T t is exogenous now, it is still debatable whether X t catches all the other factors to be controlled other than interventions: if X t fails to include variables which have an explanatory power on S t , 1 will be inconsistent again. Of course, most empirical research has the omitted variables problem more or less, but unfortunately, it is particularly di¢ cult to …nd a valid X t for the daily nominal exchange rate model. Existing papers have tried news and(or) day of the week dummy variables, and Macroeconomic variables such as the interest rate spread as X t 2 . However, in many cases they are not statistically signi…cant. 1 See the literature review of Galati et al., 2005 2 Bonser-Neal and Tanner(1996) used macroeconomic news announcement dummy variables and sur- Messe and Rogo¤ (1983) have showed that macroeconomic models under-performed a simple random work model in monthly out-of-sample prediction. Moreover, we focus on the daily horizon in which it is believed that macro variables are less relevant with the exchange rate than the longer horizon.
How can we avoid the endogeneity problems? For the simultaneous bias, we will have to take into account an intervention reaction function such as
where Y t is other factors that explain intervention decisions. (Neely(2005) ) Now we have a system of equations to be estimated, thus valid instrumental variables are needed to estimate the system of equations. However, similar to the di¢ culties in …nding a relevant X t , a lack of valid IVs now can be problematic. 3 In this paper, 'customer trades' were used as IVs and the empirical results veri…ed that they were valid. In addition, customer trades data were shown to be closely related with the spot rate movements, thus they were used for resolving the omitted variable bias. That is, the equation (1) was split into market demand/supply equations, and then customer demand (supply) trades data were used for identifying supply (demand) curve. Besides, the mechanism that the interventions may a¤ect the rate became more transparent by specifying the demand and supply curves. In speci…c, if the interventions shift the demand/supply curves to the desired directions without ‡attening the curves, 'leaning against winds'operations will be e¤ective.
The estimation strategy is as follows. First, Markov-switching type policy reaction functions were estimated by the Conditional Maximum Likelihood method. Both the regimes and latent variables were modeled as functions of S t , therefore they were endogenous. Then the market demand/supply curves were estimated by Instrumental Variables method with prise component of the announced variables; Dominguez(1993 Dominguez( , 1998 out-perform the random walk model in one-step-ahead prediction. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Part 2 describes the Korean foreign exchange market and the data set, and part 3 illustrates the system that speci…es the interactions between interventions, market participants'behavior, and the exchange rate. Part 4 shows the empirical results, and the conclusion follows. Because the Korean won is not internationalized yet, it is traded only in the Korean foreign exchange market. In speci…c, the Korean won spot rate is determined in the Korean inter-bank market which has a 'limit order book'. That is, the market participants' limit orders to buy (or sell) at certain prices meet each other electronically without dealers. The Thus, rather than specifying underlying macroeconomic theory, I focus on the fact that the rate is determined in the inter-bank market. That is, whatever it is, a macroeconomic variable a¤ects the rate only via the market participants' behaviors. In this sense, if we can identify the demand and the supply curves, we will be able to predict the rate validly, thus correctly analyze policy issues such as e¢ cacy of interventions. Speci…cally, similar to the market microstructure approach to the exchange rate that takes 'order ‡ows'seriously, (Lyons(2001) ) I assumed that the daily ‡ow of the demand and the supply will determine the day's rate change, not the stock of the demand and the supply at the end of the day.
Facts and Data
One of the advantages of identifying the curves is that this model allows the interventions to change not only the value of variables that the market participants take into account, but also the structural parameters which depict the participants'behavior.
The behavior of market participants
Assume that the inter-bank foreign exchange market consists of two representative decision making agents: a demander, and a supplier. The demander receives C Dt (customer demand for USD plus dollar buying interventions) from its customers including the central bank and the supplier receives C St (customer supply for USD plus dollar selling interventions) at day t. However, they are assumed to have no information on the magnitude of interventions.
That is, the demander (supplier) only knows the aggregate magnitude of customer demand (supply). But the presence of the central bank in the market is assumed to be known to both parties. By denoting Dt ( St ) as an information set for the demander (supplier) at day t, assumptions on information are summarized as follows.
Assumptions on information
Given the customer demand (supply) ‡ows, coupled with their own speculative views, they form a daily demand (supply) schedule. To show this, let's suppose that the demander and the supplier maximize the expected utility from a wealth de…ned as follows:
where W Dt (W St ) is a wealth of demander (supplier), Q Dt (Q St ) is a quantity demanded (supplied), S t is S t S t 1 , and S t is the spot rate of Korean won against USD at day t.
S . Additionally, for a simple closed form objective function of the maximization problem, assume S t+1 follows normal distribution conditional on the information available to demander (supplier). To show this normality, let's partition the time interval from t to t + 1 into N sub-intervals, t = k 0 < k 1 < k 3 < ::: < k N = t + 1, i.e. time index t is for day-by-day index, and k is for tick-by-tick index. Thus, if the rate di¤erentials for small fraction of times in day t + 1 are independent and identically distributed conditional on the information at day t, by the Central Limit Theorem, we have
where
. This generates the maximization problems for the demander and the supplier as follows:
From the …rst order conditions, we have the optimal choice of the demander and the supplier as follows:
Now the issue is how we can model the expected values and variances of the future exchange rate di¤erentials which are conditional on the participants'information. The conditional expected value of the demander (supplier) was modeled as a linear function of several explanatory variables. First, the customer demand (supply) was included because it may used as a daily proxy variable for macroeconomic fundamentals such as current account and capital in ‡ow as described in part 2. Second, the lagged value of transaction volume was included. The past volume is what was actually demanded (supplied) in the past, thus they were assumed to capture the unknown factors that in ‡uence the quantity demanded (supplied) in an autoregressive way. For the last, the di¤erence of Japanese yen rate was included to re ‡ect a speculative motive in Korean won market. As illustrated in …gure 1, the Korean won was synchronized with the Japanese yen for the sample period, and the movements of the yen had a signi…cant impact on the sentiment of the Korean won traders in that period.
For conditional variance, I hypothesized that it remains constant for the sample period.
However, since market participants were assumed to know whether the central bank is intervening or not, the conditional variance may be di¤erent between the days with and without intervention. Whether there was di¤erence in the conditional variance will be tested. Under these assumptions, the demand and the supply curve to be estimated is
where JP Y t is the USD/JPY rate di¤erential, C D(S)t is decomposed intoC D(S)t + BU Y t (SELL t ) withC D(S)t as the customer demand (supply) ‡ow without interventions and "'s are error terms.
In this simple mean-variance argument, the sterilized interventions matter in two ways.
First, they can a¤ect the conditional expectations. In this model, the central bank can change C D(S)t to shift the demand (supply) curve, thus a¤ect the rate. I will denote this e¤ect as a 'liquidity e¤ect'. However, interventions can make behavioral parameters ( 's) distinct across the days with and without intervention. For example, if the interventions decrease uncertainty in future rate (V ar[ S t+1 j D(S)t ]), j D7 j and j S7 j will increase and the demand (supply) curve will be ‡attened. This will decrease the impact of shifting the curves.
Reaction function of central bank
As explained in part 2, the Bank of Korea is assumed to lean against winds in the sample period. That is, it intervened when the rate abruptly moved, thus simple reaction functions modeling this behavior are as follows.
where BU Y t and SELL t are latent intervention values, and u's are error terms. However, there are many clustered zeros in the intervention series, thus a threshold type model is more plausible for the reaction function. That is, interventions should be expressed as
where d t = 1 when there was an intervention and d t = 0 otherwise.
This reaction function postulates a two-step decision on the intervention. First, the central bank decides whether it will intervene (d t = 1). Then, it will choose the magnitude of the interventions (BU Y t and SELL t ). Therefore, d t is also a function of S t . To model this endogeneity in the intervention regime, a Markov-switching probability is de…ned as follows:
where p t is the probability of switching from 'no intervention regime'to 'intervention regime', q t is the probability of remaining in the 'intervention regime',~ t is the information set of the central bank and S trend t is a moving average trend of the rate. That is, according to this reaction function, the central bank will intervene when the rate is deviated from the trend; and the amount of the intervention will depend on the previous day's intervention and S t .
To estimate the reaction functions, the conditional log likelihood functions are set up as follows:
Under these settings, the maximization problems are 4 Empirical results
Estimation on coe¢ cients
Simple descriptive statistics for the variables were shown in Table 1 . By the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, no variables were shown to have a unit root thus I could proceed with the estimation. First, the intervention policy reaction functions were estimated with CMLE.
As in Table 2 , most of parameters were signi…cant under 5% level. Next, the demand and the supply curves were estimated. Since I assumed that the market participants only observed the aggregate value of customer trades and the interventions, new explanatory variables were generated as follows:
whereC D(S)t is the customer trade without the interventions. To avoid the simultaneity bias from S t in the demand and the supply equations, this paper tried Generalized Method of Moments for estimating coe¢ cients. I could identify the two equations because of the assumption that the customer demand (supply) a¤ects the equilibrium rate, and it is only through the demand (supply) behavior. Speci…cally, the customer demand (supply) will be a good instrumental variable for the supply (demand) curve. The estimation results were summarized in Table 3 and 4. Pagan-Hall test statistics showed that the errors were homoskedastic, thus simple IV estimation (2SLS) was applied. Except for the constant in the supply curve, all the coe¢ cients were signi…cant under 10% signi…cance level. 5 For the validity of instrumental variables, Anderson canonical correlation likelihood ratio statistic rejected the null hypothesis that the IVs were weak in the both equations under 1% signi…cance level, and Sargan's statistic showed that the IVs were exogenous in the both equations. Portmanteau Q statistic indicated that residuals were white noise with 1, 5 and 10 lags. These features show that the coe¢ cients are consistently estimated.
The signs of coe¢ cients correspond with intuitions. The demand (supply) curve was downward (upward) sloping, and if the price of the USD denominated by the Japanese yen (the USD/JPY rate) increased, the expected USD price denominated by the Korean won, i.e. E[ S t+1 j D(S)t ], also increased in both equations. The customer trades have a positive relationship with the quantity demanded (supplied) in the same day, but a negative relationship for the quantity in the day after.
The predictive power of the model is another issue. Figure 2 illustrates the in-sample predicted value of the exchange rate which solves the estimated demand and supply curve.
For the out-of-sample prediction, I followed Messe and Rogo¤(1983)'s arguments. That is, the model was estimated with the …rst 10 days, and then the one-day-after prediction was made with the estimated coe¢ cients. By expanding the sample size by one day, this procedure was repeated. Results in Table 5 show that this model has lower mean squared errors and mean absolute errors in one-day-after prediction compared with a random walk model.
What remains is to check whether the conditional variances were di¤erent between the days with and without the interventions. The equation (9) and (10) shows that if they are di¤erent, 's should be di¤erent. Thus, Chow test was applied, and the result in Table 6 showed that we couldn't reject the null hypothesis that they were same. Therefore, I could conclude that the intervention of the Bank of Korea made no distinction in the participant's behavioral parameters.
The hypothetical rate and the e¤ect of the intervention
What would have happened in the foreign exchange market if there were no interventions?
The answer can be tackled in two ways: the intervention may shift the demand and the supply curves (liquidity e¤ect), and also may change the slopes of the curves. However, this paper shows that the slopes were same across the days with and without intervention, thus what remains is the liquidity e¤ect. Shifted curves were derived by replacing C D(S)t with C D(S)t and solving the simultaneous equations. In this way, the hypothetical rate which assumes that there were no interventions is generated, as illustrated in Figure 3 .
Since it was assumed that the Bank of Korea tried to minimize the abrupt change in the rate, the sample variance of S t can be a criterion for assessing the e¢ cacy of the operations. Table 7 shows the …nal results. The sample variance of S t was 32.708, but in the hypothetical rate, it was 32.969 in the overall period, which means that the interventions decreased the actual market volatility. More interestingly, this hypothesis rate argument can be used for specifying the causal relationship between the volatile market and the interventions. That is, in the hypothetical world, the sample variance of the S t was 25.792 for the days without interventions, but it was 55.717 when there were interventions. This means that the Bank of Korea intervened because the market was volatile, but not the other way. Furthermore, the sample variance of the actual rate di¤erentials in the days with intervention was 54.523, which means that the interventions decreased the market volatility measured by the sample variance of the rate di¤erentials.
This paper showed that there was no signi…cant di¤erence in the agents'behaviors with the interventions. Therefore, only the liquidity shock accounts for the e¤ectiveness of in-tervention. Leaning against winds operations are to supply the liquidity to the market in the opposite direction of the rate movements, thus every leaning against winds operations will always decrease the volatility if the market participants do not change their behavioral pattern. In speci…c, if the market participants expect that the variance of S t+1 will be decreased with interventions of the day t, they will be more willing to change the quantity demanded (supplied) with given change in S t . But this makes the curves ‡atter, therefore the liquidity e¤ect (or e¤ect on the expected value of S t ), represented by the shifts of the curves, may be o¤set.
Conclusion
Endogeneity problems impede the analysis on the e¤ectiveness of intervention. In most of the cases, we had to estimate only a reduced form equation taking endogenous variables as regressors, thus the results were obscure. The main motivation of this paper was to clarify the interactions between interventions, market participants'behavior, and the exchange rate.
The endogeneity problem can be solved by this clari…cation.
For the task, a system of equations was speci…ed. Market participants were modeled to solve utility maximization problems, and the central bank secretly intervenes to a¤ect the exchange rate. But again, the central bank reacts to the exchange rate movements.
The model predicts that the interventions will be e¤ective, i) if the interventions in ‡uence the participants'conditional expectation in the desired direction (liquidity e¤ect), and ii) if the interventions do not decrease the uncertainty perceived by the participants. We cannot guarantee the e¢ cacy of the interventions if any of these two conditions fail.
To consistently estimate the equations, we should have valid IVs. Customer trades were proposed as IVs, and the empirical results showed that the IVs were valid. In addition, the model out-performed the random work model in out-of-sample prediction. More importantly, the interventions of the Bank of Korea in the sample period were shown to have insigni…cant e¤ects on the behavioral parameters but have the liquidity e¤ect. Therefore, the e¤ectiveness was ensured by the conditions above. With estimated coe¢ cients, the sys- 
